Anwar Gargash’s defence of the UAE’s relationship with the Somali people deserves support. Responding to criticism from Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the UAE president’s diplomatic adviser argued that enduring ties should survive political disagreements. His central proposition is sound: governments should judge international partnerships by their consequences for citizens, security and prosperity. [1]
Puntland gives that argument practical substance. Its cooperation with the UAE has supported institutions engaged in protecting the coastline and confronting armed extremist groups. An assessment of Emirati involvement should account for those contributions, the people who sustain them and the risks of disrupting them.
The immediate controversy follows Mohamud’s televised address on November 17. According to Somalia’s official news agency, he accused the UAE of supporting forces outside the national command structure and entering port agreements beyond the Mogadishu government’s authority. These are serious allegations. Examining them requires specific agreements, evidence of alleged violations and a defensible account of the remedies sought. [2]
Preserving useful cooperation is a strategic responsibility. The case for supporting Gargash begins with what that cooperation has contributed to Somali security and the institutions that sustain it.
Maritime security and counterterrorism
The Puntland Maritime Police Force, or PMPF, illustrates the connection. Ido Levy’s 2025 study, also published in Defense & Security Analysis, documents the UAE’s role in creating, funding and supervising the force. Originally established for counterpiracy and maritime security, the PMPF subsequently acquired an important counterterrorism role against Al-Shabaab and Islamic State. This institutional history deserves recognition when evaluating the partnership. [3]
Counterpiracy and counterterrorism require distinct mandates and tactics. Both can benefit from capable coastal institutions, reliable information and the ability to disrupt illicit movement. A foreign-policy review should examine how changes to cooperation would affect each function.
Security across the Gulf of Aden
The United Nations Monitoring Team’s report published in February 2026 assessed that Operation Hilaac, conducted with regional and international partners, had significantly reduced the Islamic State threat in Somalia. It also recorded Member State reports of foreign terrorist fighters moving from Puntland towards Yemen through the Gulf of Aden. The same assessment warned that the group retained resilience and could exploit mountainous sanctuaries and coastal routes. Its findings drew on information received up to December 15, 2025. [4]
The analytical implication is clear: security pressure on one shore can affect threats on the other. Puntland’s counterterrorism efforts therefore carry regional significance. Maintaining pressure requires attention to movement, financing and opportunities to regroup, alongside territorial gains. The partnership should be evaluated within that wider geography.
Local institutions and local sacrifice
Puntland’s forces carry the immediate burden of defending communities and holding ground. External funding, training and equipment become useful through the personnel, local knowledge and institutional continuity that Puntland provides. Credit should reflect that relationship.
This is also why diplomatic decisions require consultation with the communities and institutions that would bear their consequences. Puntland’s citizens have a direct interest in arrangements affecting coastal protection and security operations. Their experience belongs in any serious assessment of the UAE relationship.
A dispute over constitutional authority requires negotiation and a clear legal resolution. It also requires a practical account of how security responsibilities will be fulfilled while that dispute is addressed.
The costs of a diplomatic rupture
Political declarations can be issued quickly. Replacing trained personnel, maintenance arrangements, funding commitments and institutional relationships takes time. Any proposal to terminate cooperation should explain which capabilities would change, who would replace them, how replacement would be financed and what would happen during the transition.
These are questions for the Mogadishu government, Puntland and the UAE to answer through a documented review. Where an arrangement requires revision, the review should identify the defect and the corrective action. Where cooperation delivers a demonstrable public benefit, decision-makers should explain how that benefit will be preserved.
Humanitarian cooperation supplies a concrete example. In January 2025, Somalia’s own news agency reported that the Somali Disaster Management Agency had received 700 tonnes of UAE food aid. Allocations included 300 tonnes for Kismayo, 200 for Bosaso and 200 for Banadir and other relief areas. That record shows cooperation reaching communities across political jurisdictions. [5]
Agreements that sustain cooperation
The UN Panel of Experts’ 2021 report recognised the PMPF’s substantial capability against extremist groups, weapons smuggling and piracy. The report also criticised an unnotified delivery of military equipment by a UAE-operated aircraft and warned that insufficient transparency prejudiced the force’s development. Both findings belong in an honest assessment. [6]
The lesson for today is institutional. Clear agreements, lawful authorisation, accountable funding and credible investigation of alleged civilian harm can make security cooperation more durable. Puntland and the UAE would strengthen their case by demonstrating how their arrangements meet those requirements.
The UAE’s stated diplomatic commitments provide a further benchmark. In their joint statement of January 6, 2026, the African Union Commission and the UAE reaffirmed support for Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability. Those commitments offer a basis for assessing conduct and negotiating workable arrangements. [7]
Gargash also questioned whether personal political considerations were influencing Mohamud’s position. That remains a political judgment. The strongest case for supporting Gargash rests on the policy principle he advances: Somali interests require continuity, evidence and a capacity to resolve disputes without sacrificing valuable relationships.
For Puntland, the priority should be to preserve effective security cooperation through arrangements that withstand public and legal scrutiny. For the Mogadishu government, leadership requires addressing contested agreements while protecting the capabilities and services on which citizens depend. For the UAE, a durable partnership requires respect for Somali communities, transparent commitments and accountability for its actions.
Gargash is right to place the relationship with the Somali people above a passing political confrontation. Puntland’s cooperation with the UAE gives that position practical weight. The task now is to protect the partnership’s public benefits and build the institutions that can sustain them.
Sources
- Gulf News, “Anwar Gargash criticises Somali president’s attack on UAE, reaffirms ties with its people,” November 18, 2026.
- SONNA, “Somalia draws its line: the President and the Justice Minister set out the case against UAE interference,” November 17, 2026. Used as the Mogadishu government’s account of its position.
- Ido Levy, “Fighting Pirates and Terror: The Development of the Puntland Maritime Police Force, 2010–2023,” October 2025. Also published in Defense & Security Analysis.
- UN Security Council, S/2026/44, February 4, 2026, paragraphs 35–37. This is a dated assessment, based on information received up to December 15, 2025.
- SONNA, “SoDMA Receives 700 Tons of Food Aid from UAE for Drought-Affected Communities,” January 8, 2025.
- UN Security Council, S/2021/849, October 6, 2021, paragraphs 100–101. The equipment-notification criticism concerns the historical sanctions framework addressed by that report.
- African Union Commission and UAE, joint statement, January 6, 2026.
