There is a Somali word for a place where waste accumulates: musqusha. Applied to Mogadishu’s political establishment, it is a deliberately provocative metaphor. The accusation concerns the degradation of political institutions, constitutional commitments, public accountability and the relationship between rulers and citizens. It is directed at a governing system, rather than the people of Mogadishu, who have themselves endured decades of insecurity and political upheaval.

For Puntland, the substantive question beneath the insult is whether participation in Somalia’s federal institutions continues to serve its constitutional interests. Five issues explain why the relationship has reached such a consequential point.

1. The Constitutional Contract

Puntland established its administration in 1998, fourteen years before Somalia adopted its provisional federal constitution in 2012. Its institutions therefore preceded the contemporary federal settlement.

The 2012 constitution recognized important principles of shared authority. Article 54 required negotiation between the federal government and member states over the allocation of powers and resources. Article 142 protected certain powers of pre-existing states and required consultation over federal arrangements.

Yet constitutional negotiations have repeatedly produced disagreement over who possesses authority to revise the foundational rules.

In March 2024, Puntland rejected constitutional amendments adopted in Mogadishu and announced that it would exercise its authority independently until an agreed constitutional framework emerged.

The Mogadishu government defended constitutional revision as necessary for political stability and electoral reform. Puntland challenged the legitimacy of changes adopted without its agreement.

The disagreement concerns a foundational constitutional question: can federal institutions alter the distribution of political authority without securing the consent of the governments whose powers are affected?

2. The Centralization of Political Authority

Federalism distributes public authority among institutions with constitutionally protected responsibilities. Its durability depends on enforceable limits, agreed procedures and institutions capable of resolving disputes.

Puntland’s objections concern the possibility that constitutional revisions and federal administrative practices could concentrate authority in the presidency.

The 2024 amendments intensified these concerns by changing presidential election arrangements and the president’s relationship with the prime minister.

Supporters argued that the changes would improve political accountability and governmental stability. Critics questioned their effects on institutional checks.

The relevant question is whether Somalia’s constitutional framework can accommodate genuinely autonomous member states while maintaining an effective national government.

Without credible constitutional arbitration, disagreements risk becoming struggles over political power rather than disputes resolved through law.

3. Security and the Question of Responsibility

Puntland maintains security institutions that undertake counterterrorism, policing and territorial protection. Their performance must be judged through operational evidence, civilian protection, financial accountability and lawful command arrangements.

Somalia’s federal government likewise carries national defence responsibilities, including the coordination of military operations and international security assistance.

These responsibilities create unavoidable questions concerning command authority, financing, intelligence sharing and accountability.

Who decides where security forces operate? Who pays their personnel? Who authorizes outside assistance? Who investigates misconduct?

When political relations deteriorate, uncertainty over these questions can weaken security coordination and complicate responses to armed organizations.

Puntland’s institutional interests therefore require arrangements that protect operational effectiveness while establishing transparent responsibility for military expenditure and security decisions.

4. Revenue, Resources and Economic Authority

Political autonomy has limited practical meaning without fiscal capacity.

Federal disputes over taxation, external assistance, development finance, natural resources and infrastructure determine which institutions can deliver public services and undertake long-term investment.

The 2012 constitutional settlement anticipated negotiation over the division of powers and resources. Persistent disagreement raises questions about how public revenue should be collected, allocated and audited.

Puntland possesses significant commercial interests, including Bosaso’s port, livestock trade, fisheries and potential resource development.

Its economic prospects depend on predictable regulation, enforceable commercial arrangements, infrastructure investment and transparent public finances.

An independent fiscal assessment would need to establish what Puntland contributes, receives, administers and potentially loses under alternative constitutional arrangements.

Claims of exploitation or financial advantage require auditable evidence rather than political declarations.

5. The Legitimacy of Political Representation

The deepest dispute concerns political consent.

Puntland’s residents have interests in public security, economic opportunity, accountable institutions and meaningful representation. Political leaders cannot establish the population’s constitutional preferences solely through statements, parliamentary resolutions or selective consultations.

Any proposed change in Puntland’s relationship with Somalia requires clarity about its legal foundations, territorial implications, public mandate and likely consequences.

Three alternatives remain subjects of political debate: renegotiated federalism, continued autonomous administration within a disputed framework, and a more fundamental change in political status.

Each raises difficult questions about citizenship, international recognition, trade, security cooperation and minority rights.

A constitutional dispute cannot be resolved sustainably without confronting these consequences.

The Question Mogadishu Must Answer

The metaphor of musqusha expresses anger at a political system perceived by its critics as incapable of honoring constitutional commitments. Anger, however, provides neither a constitutional settlement nor an economic plan.

Mogadishu’s institutions must address the substance of Puntland’s objections through credible negotiation, transparent allocation of authority and enforceable constitutional procedures.

Puntland’s institutions face corresponding obligations to demonstrate accountability, safeguard political pluralism and establish the public legitimacy of their constitutional choices.

The governing question is ultimately institutional: what arrangements can protect Puntland’s autonomy, preserve public security and secure accountable government?

That question deserves an answer grounded in constitutional authority, demonstrable public consent and the consequences for the people whose future is being decided.