Fighting in northern Ethiopia expanded toward Lalibela on September 24, forcing the suspension of flights to the historic Amhara town and adding a new geographic front to a confrontation that had already spread across Tigray, Afar and Amhara. Reuters reported that seven sources confirmed the flight suspension and that combat had intensified around Lalibela. A diplomatic source said fighting was occurring around the town rather than inside it at the time of reporting.
The same day, Ethiopia's military made its first detailed public statement about the renewed fighting. Lieutenant General Assefa Chekol, commander of the North East Command, said federal forces had repelled a Tigray People's Liberation Front offensive and claimed that 272 attackers had been killed and 260 wounded. Reuters said it could not independently verify those figures, and a TPLF spokesperson did not respond to its request for comment. The casualty numbers therefore remain a military claim rather than an independently established count.
The TPLF continues to describe its operations as self-defence against what it calls a full-scale federal assault involving ground forces, aircraft, drones and artillery. Addis Ababa describes the same sequence as a premeditated TPLF offensive against federal positions and civilian infrastructure. Those competing accounts remain unresolved. What is more securely established is that the fighting has widened substantially since Tigrayan forces seized the airports at Mekelle, Axum and Shire on September 23.
Lalibela extends the conflict's geography
Lalibela matters because it lies in Amhara, south of the Tigray boundary, and sits on routes connecting northern Ethiopia. The town is also internationally known for its medieval rock-hewn churches. The suspension of civilian aviation there indicates that the conflict is affecting transport beyond the three Tigray airports already taken out of normal service.
Reuters reported that four diplomats, two residents and a source linked to the TPLF and the allied Fano militia described intensified fighting around Lalibela. Residents were reported to be withdrawing cash, while people in Mekelle and Adigrat were buying food and medicine amid fears of a return to the shortages and isolation experienced during the 2020-2022 war. Reports from residents also alleged forced recruitment of young people by Tigrayan forces. The TPLF has previously denied conducting forced recruitment, and the individual allegations have not been independently verified.
PUNT NEWS's September 23 report documented the initial widening of combat into Afar and Amhara. An earlier report records the seizure of the three Tigray airports and the African Union's call for de-escalation. Both remain permanently available as records of the conflict's earlier stages.
Internal divisions inside Tigray have become operationally relevant
A separate Reuters analysis published on September 24 reported that four veteran Tigrayan military figures were detained overnight by armed men. A family member identified former Tigray Defence Forces commander-in-chief Tadesse Werede among those detained. Reuters said the group had publicly expressed reservations about another war. The TPLF did not respond to Reuters questions about the detentions, while a spokesperson for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed declined to comment.
The detentions matter because Tigray entered the 2020 war with a comparatively cohesive regional political and military leadership. The postwar period produced visible divisions inside the TPLF, including the displacement of the interim regional administration by a harder-line party faction. Renewed fighting is therefore unfolding while Tigray has more external allies than it did in 2020 and less internal political cohesion.
That combination complicates any simple description of the current conflict as a repeat of the previous war. The TPLF announced an alliance on September 21 with six other armed groups opposed to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government. Reuters has reported Tigrayan forces operating alongside Fano forces in Amhara and a local armed group in Afar. Yet the new coalition contains actors with different histories, territorial interests and command structures. Cooperation on particular fronts does not by itself establish a unified national command.
Regional risk is rising faster than the evidence can settle responsibility
The deteriorating relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea adds another layer of uncertainty. Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea of supporting armed groups opposed to the federal government. Asmara denies the allegation. No independently verified evidence reviewed for this article establishes direct Eritrean participation in the September 24 fighting. The distinction is important because direct interstate involvement would materially widen the conflict beyond the already serious domestic escalation.
The United Nations and European Union have urged restraint and a return to the African Union-brokered peace process. The EU said differences should be resolved through dialogue rather than military action. Those appeals reinforce the African Union's September 23 position that the airport seizures, detention of federal personnel and disruption of civilian aviation are incompatible with commitments under the 2022 Pretoria Agreement.
The Pretoria settlement ended large-scale war without resolving every territorial, security and political dispute that survived it. The present fighting exposes the consequences of that incomplete settlement. Airport control, armed-group alliances, unresolved relations with Eritrea, internal Tigrayan divisions and competing claims over responsibility are now interacting at the same time.
The most defensible description at this stage is therefore narrower than either side's political narrative. Fighting has expanded toward Lalibela; civilian flights there have been suspended; Ethiopia's army has publicly claimed heavy TPLF losses that remain unverified; Tigray's leaders continue to describe their campaign as defensive; and Reuters has reported the detention of senior Tigrayan military figures associated with reservations about renewed war. Together, those developments indicate both territorial escalation and growing strain inside the Tigrayan political-military coalition.
