Puntland has opened a new maritime-security operation along its coast as piracy again becomes a serious problem in the Gulf of Aden. Horseed Media reported on September 20 that units of the Puntland Maritime Police Force, or PMPF, had begun patrols aimed at disrupting pirate groups, illegal weapons movements and organized maritime crime. Officers also described intelligence work intended to identify supply routes, weapons, personnel and coastal staging areas used by groups preparing attacks.

The operation comes at a moment when piracy is no longer a hypothetical risk. The International Maritime Organization said on August 24 that a sixth vessel was being held by pirates and armed robbers in the Gulf of Aden and surrounding waters, with more than 90 seafarers in captivity. Earlier, on July 6, the IMO said it had recorded 24 attempted and actual incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the preceding three months. The numbers make the Puntland operation part of a wider regional security response rather than a local policing exercise.

From patrols to networks

The most important part of the Puntland announcement may be the emphasis on intelligence. Pirate attacks occur at sea, yet successful hijackings depend on activity on land. Boats need fuel, weapons and crews. Captured ships require places where they can be held. Ransom negotiations need intermediaries and communications. In the piracy crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s, the business became durable because it developed an ecosystem that extended beyond the men who boarded ships.

Horseed reported that PMPF officers are trying to identify exactly those kinds of support systems: sources of supplies, weapons, personnel and gathering points. If that description is accurate, the operation is intended to disrupt piracy before attackers reach international shipping lanes. That is a different task from intercepting an already hijacked ship, and in principle it can be more effective.

The police force is also using fast patrol craft, according to the report, and is pursuing groups accused of earlier hijackings in waters between the Horn of Africa and Yemen. Horseed attributed those details to Puntland security officers. PUNT NEWS has not independently established the location or identity of the groups being pursued, so those claims remain attributed.

A familiar problem returns

Puntland has been here before. The Gulf of Aden and the waters around Cape Guardafui were central to the Somali piracy boom that peaked more than a decade ago. Hijackings became a ransom industry, drawing in financiers, negotiators, coastal intermediaries and armed groups. International naval deployments, armed guards on merchant ships and changes in shipping practice eventually made successful attacks much harder.

The decline was dramatic enough to create the impression that piracy had been defeated. Yet the underlying economics never disappeared entirely. Long coastlines remain difficult to police. Fishing communities can be remote from government institutions. A successful ransom can generate more money than most coastal livelihoods. When maritime security weakens, the incentive can return quickly.

The IMO's 2026 warnings show how quickly that can happen. In July the organization said 44 seafarers were being held aboard three detained vessels. By late August it said more than 90 seafarers were captive and six vessels were being held. Those are humanitarian figures as much as security statistics. Crews can spend months with uncertain access to food, water and medical care while their families receive limited information.

Puntland's particular stake

For Puntland, piracy creates costs even when no ship is hijacked inside its territorial waters. The region's long coastline faces both the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Bosaso is a commercial port, and coastal trade is part of the economy. A reputation for maritime insecurity raises the risk attached to the whole area, potentially affecting insurance, routing decisions and the willingness of commercial operators to use nearby waters.

There is also a political cost. Modern piracy became associated internationally with the Somali coast. Puntland authorities have therefore had a long-standing interest in demonstrating that coastal communities and security institutions are not synonymous with pirate networks. An operation that targets logistics and organizers, rather than treating all coastal activity as suspicious, is important to that distinction.

The PMPF itself grew out of the period when piracy made maritime security a core Puntland concern. Its role has since extended beyond piracy into other security tasks. The current operation returns the force to the problem most closely associated with its original public purpose: making the coastline harder to use as a base for attacks at sea.

A crowded maritime theatre

The timing is complicated by the wider Red Sea crisis. The Gulf of Aden now contains naval forces dealing with several different threats. European and multinational missions are protecting shipping from missile and drone attacks linked to the Yemen conflict. Operation Atalanta continues its counter-piracy role. National navies are also present. More ships and surveillance can improve deterrence, yet the missions have different legal mandates and priorities.

Piracy is not the same problem as attacks connected to regional war. A naval vessel equipped to defend a merchant ship from missiles may not be carrying out the boarding, hostage-recovery and criminal-investigation tasks needed for counter-piracy. That makes cooperation between local coastal forces and international naval missions especially important.

The IMO made the same point at a regional maritime-law-enforcement dialogue held in Nairobi in August. Agencies from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen met with international partners to discuss piracy, armed robbery, geopolitical tensions and organized crime. The organization described regional cooperation as essential because the threats overlap geographically even when their causes differ.

What success would look like

The immediate test of Puntland's operation will not simply be the number of patrols or arrests. The better measure is whether pirate groups lose the ability to organize attacks from the coast. That means watching whether vessels and crews already held are released, whether new hijackings decline, whether suspected supply networks are disrupted and whether international reporting begins to show fewer incidents in waters near Puntland.

It will also matter whether enforcement distinguishes piracy from ordinary fishing and maritime commerce. Coastal security works best when legitimate users of the sea have reasons to cooperate with authorities. Fishermen and local residents can provide information that patrol boats cannot gather on their own. Heavy-handed enforcement could weaken that advantage.

PUNT NEWS's existing piracy explainer remains the historical background to this story. The new development is operational: Puntland says it has moved from monitoring the resurgence to a targeted maritime campaign. The old piracy economy was broken when the costs and risks of hijacking rose sharply. The question in 2026 is whether Puntland and its partners can raise those costs again before a handful of successful attacks hardens into another durable business model.