The Problem of Somaliland’s Legitimacy

Somaliland’s strongest political claim has long rested on two propositions. The first is historical: the territory of the former British Somaliland Protectorate became independent on 26 June 1960 and later entered union with the former Italian-administered territory. The second is institutional: since declaring the restoration of its independence in 1991, Somaliland has built a comparatively stable political order and has repeatedly held competitive elections. Both propositions matter. Neither settles the harder question of political legitimacy across the whole territory that Hargeisa claims. (United Kingdom, 1960)

The distinction between a territorial claim and effective political authority is central. Somaliland’s constitution defines its territory by reference to the former British Protectorate. That position has a clear historical basis. The British Somaliland Order in Council of 1960 provided for the Protectorate to become an independent country on 26 June 1960. A legal-historical boundary, however, does not by itself establish contemporary consent, administrative reach, or democratic representation. Those are separate questions. (United Kingdom, 1960)

International legitimacy adds another layer. Somaliland’s historical case starts from the separate independence of the former protectorate in June 1960. Its contemporary claim remains contested internationally. The African Union continues to affirm Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity and does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state. The United Kingdom likewise states that it does not recognize Somaliland’s independence and that any change in status depends on agreement between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. International recognition and domestic legitimacy are distinct. A government can possess substantial internal authority while its external legal status remains contested, and external recognition would not by itself establish whether citizens throughout the claimed territory accept that government. (African Union, 2026; Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2025)

Somaliland’s 13 November 2024 presidential election demonstrated genuine electoral capacity. More than 1.2 million voters were registered. The National Electoral Commission reported 638,126 valid presidential votes, and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” won 63.92 per cent. The principal candidates accepted the result, and the opposition replaced the incumbent government. International observers described election day as peaceful and well managed. These facts make it inaccurate to dismiss Somaliland’s elections as fictitious. (Somaliland National Electoral Commission, 2024; University College London International Election Observation Mission, 2025)

Map of 2024 Somaliland presidential election results by district — Map: 2024 Somaliland presidential election results by district, based on National Electoral Commission results. SanGarba via Wikimedia Commons, CC0. This map shows reported election results, not contemporary territorial control.

The democratic claim has important limits. The University College London international observation mission reported that elections could not take place, either fully or partially, in five of Somaliland’s 23 districts because of security concerns. Turnout for both elections was below 53 per cent. The presidential election itself had also been delayed for two years beyond its originally scheduled date. Freedom House has documented delayed elections, pressure on journalists and public figures, political marginalisation of minority clans, and the unusual constitutional position of the Guurti, the House of Elders, whose members have repeatedly extended mandates, including their own. (Freedom House, 2024; University College London International Election Observation Mission, 2025)

The territorial problem is more consequential. Somaliland presents elections conducted within accessible districts as evidence of a polity corresponding to the former British Protectorate. That inference has become increasingly difficult to sustain. After the fighting in Las Anod in 2023, Somaliland forces withdrew and SSC-Khaatumo consolidated control there. European Union Agency for Asylum reporting based on territorial control as of 31 March 2026 described Las Anod, Taleh, Hudun and surrounding eastern areas as controlled by a federal-aligned coalition. Somaliland retained positions farther west, including Caynabo and Oog, with mixed-control zones in between. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026a)

Sanaag is still more fragmented. The region contains communities with different political orientations and clan affiliations, and authority varies from one locality to another. As of 31 March 2026, western Sanaag, including Erigavo, Jidali and El Afweyn, was reported under Somaliland administration. Central and southeastern areas displayed divided authority, while Badhan, Dhahar, Lasqoray and other eastern localities were controlled by autonomous armed forces or competing authorities. This is not the territorial picture of a state exercising uniform political authority throughout the boundaries it claims. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026b)

Clan authority complicates the matter further. Somaliland’s political system was deliberately constructed as a hybrid order in which customary authority and formal institutions coexist. Clan elders were central to peace-building and state formation in the early 1990s and became institutionalised through the Guurti. Scholarship on Somaliland has shown that this arrangement helped generate peace, bargaining and local legitimacy, while also creating longer-term problems for democratic accountability when unelected traditional authorities acquired durable constitutional power. (Hoehne, 2013)

This does not mean that areas governed through clan institutions exist outside Somaliland’s political order. State and clan authority often overlap. Local administration, policing, dispute resolution, taxation, security negotiation and electoral mobilisation may involve government institutions alongside customary leaders. The analytically important question therefore concerns whether central institutions possess sufficient authority and consent to claim democratic representation for populations whose everyday governance may depend heavily on autonomous clan structures.

The western regions require particular care. Claims that Somaliland exercises only nominal authority in the west are difficult to reconcile with current evidence. European Union Agency for Asylum reporting in 2026 described all of Awdal, including Borama, Lughaya and Zeila, as under Somaliland administration. The broader Somaliland section similarly reports Somaliland administration across its core western territories. Election observers also operated across all six regions during the 2024 election. The evidence therefore does not support describing western Somaliland as generally outside Hargeisa’s administrative control. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026c; University College London International Election Observation Mission, 2025)

There are nevertheless serious political grievances in Awdal. Gadabursi leaders have expressed claims of marginalisation and, in some forums, demands for separation from Somaliland. European Union Agency for Asylum reporting records such demands as well as later communal tensions. Political dissent, however, should not be conflated with absence of state control. A government can exercise administrative authority in a region while facing serious questions concerning consent, representation and the distribution of political power. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2025; European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026c)

The often repeated numerical claim that the Hargeisa government represents only about 40 per cent of the population presents an evidentiary problem. There is no recent, comprehensive and uncontested census capable of supporting such precision, and even authoritative reporting uses substantially different population estimates for some regions. A defensible critique should therefore avoid a percentage that cannot presently be established. The stronger argument relies on observable political geography: significant populations in eastern portions of the claimed territory do not participate under the same institutions, elections or security authority as populations in Hargeisa, Borama, Berbera or much of Burao. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2025)

This distinction matters for the language of democracy. A free election can be genuinely competitive for the people who participate and still provide incomplete evidence about the legitimacy of rule over populations who are excluded, outside effective control, or organised under competing authorities. Somaliland’s 2024 election showed a meaningful capacity for peaceful electoral competition and transfer of executive power. It did not resolve the status of Las Anod, eastern Sool, contested parts of Sanaag, or communities whose political allegiance lies with Somalia, Puntland, the North-Eastern State, or autonomous clan authorities. (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026a; European Union Agency for Asylum, 2026b; University College London International Election Observation Mission, 2025)

The legitimacy question therefore has at least three domestic dimensions. Electoral legitimacy concerns whether citizens can choose leaders through credible competition. Territorial legitimacy concerns whether the authority claiming a territory actually governs it. Sociological legitimacy concerns whether the people subject to that authority accept, negotiate, resist or bypass it in everyday political life. Somaliland performs differently across these dimensions and differently across space.

That unevenness is the central problem. Hargeisa can point to functioning institutions, repeated elections and peaceful transfers of power. Critics can point to delayed mandates, the unelected Guurti, restrictions on civic space, exclusion from voting in eastern districts, armed territorial contestation and communities that reject Somaliland’s sovereignty. A serious assessment has to account for both sets of evidence. (Freedom House, 2024; University College London International Election Observation Mission, 2025)

The central question is therefore less whether Somaliland “has elections” than what those elections legitimately authorize. They establish electoral authority in substantial portions of the territory administered from Hargeisa. They cannot, by themselves, demonstrate consent across every district enclosed by the borders of the former British Protectorate. Until the relationship between claimed territory, effective administration and local political consent is resolved, Somaliland’s legitimacy will remain geographically uneven, institutionally hybrid and politically contested.

References